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PSYCHOLOGICAL  SCIENCE 
Research  Article 
Decision  Structuring  in 
Important  Rea1-Life  Choices 
Kathleen  M.  Galotti 
Carleton  College 
ABSTRACT ﾑ Results  from  five  studies  of  rea1-1ife  decision 
making  are  compared.  In these  tudies,  participants  con ﾂ
sistently  constrained  the  amount  of information  hey con ﾂ
sidered  to  relatively  few  options  u d to  asomewhat  l rger 
set  of  criteria.  Over  time,  the  number  of  options  considered 
shrank,  but  the  number  of  criteria  used  did  not.  People's 
intuitive  "calibration"  with  the  predictions  of  normative 
linear  models  is  urprisingly  good. Although  there  are  ef ﾂ 
fects  of education,  and  ability  on  the  amount  of  information 
considered,  different  decision-making  styles  correlate 
mostly  with  affective  reactions  t0,  and  subjective  descrip ﾂ 
tions  of,  the  uf/i>roach  to  a  specific  decision.  Implications 
for  theoretical  mode s  of decision  making  are  discussed. 
The  processes  In   which  nonexperts  make  important  rea1-1ife 
decisions  s  a  understudied  topic.  Muchof  what  we  know  about 
people's  d cision  making  co es  e ther  from  studies  of  experts 
(e.g.,  Klein,  1998)  orfrom  laboratory  studies  in  which  experi ﾂ 
mental  participants  receive  a series  of  self-contained,  hypo ﾂ 
thetical  decision  scenarios,  often  gambles  or  games,  and  are 
asked  to  say  which  of  a set  of  options  they  would  choose  (Tv rsky 
&  Kahneman,  1974,1981).  The assumption  is  that  findings  from 
the  laboratory  will  translate  directly  to  rea1-world  decision 
making,  despite  the  number  of  extraneous  variables  that  "con ﾂ 
taminate'"  the"pure"  cognitive  processes  in  the  real  world. 
There  is  good  reason  tobe  suspicious  of  this  assumption 
(Calotti.  19892002).  Everyday  ecision  maki g  1 ikely  includes 
processes  that  simply  do  not  arise  in the  laboratory,  such  s 
searching  for  relevant  info mation  or  clarifying  goals.Moreover, 
the  existing  work  on  expert  decision  makers  by  definition 
examines  p ople  wh0,  over  the  course  of  several  years, have 
produced  a  stored  mental  library  of  examples  from  which  to draw 
when  they  face  an  instance  ofdecision  making.  We  still  know 
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surprisingly  little  about what  nonexp rts  do  when  they  make 
major  life  decisions.  Hence,  there  isa  need  for  studies  ofnon ﾂ 
experts  making  important  decisions  to  complete  th picture  of 
rea1-world  decision  making. 
Five  such  studies  are ummarized  here  (see  Table  1  for  an
overview).  Each  study  recruited  peoplefacing  a  decision they 
regarded  as  v ry important.  All  studies  required  participants  to 
describe  the  options  under  active  consideration  and  to  describe 
the  criteria  used  to  decide  among  options.  Participants  rated  the 
h list c  "good es "  of  each  option.  Two  ofthe  studies  (3  and  5) 
us d  a  structured-interview  format;  the others  used  survey 
i struments.  In  all  stud es,  participants  responded  to  a  survey 
assessing  their  affective  reactions  to  the  decision-making 
process  (e.g..  certainty,  enjo ment,  stress)  and  asking  them  to 
describe  their  approach  to  t e  specific  decision  in question. 
The  first  studv  investigated  high  school  students  choosing  a 
college  (Galotti.  1995a,  1995b;  Galotti  &  Kozherg.  1996;  Galotti 
&  Mark,  1994).  The  second  study  followed  Ist-year  c eg  
students  as  they  decided  on  their  college  major  (Galotti,  1999).
The  third  study  (Galotti,  2001;  Galot i,  Pierce,  Reimer,  & 
Luckner,  2000)  asked  pr gnant  women  about  their  choice  of a
birth  attendant  (e.g.,  obstetrician,  family-practice  phys cian, 
certified  nurse-midwife).  The  fourth  study  was a  replication  of 
the  second  that  also  included  individual  difference  measures  to
assess  the  effects  o   decision-making  styles (Galotti  et  a1..  2006). 
The  fifth  study  tracked  parents  of kindergarten  students  over  the
course  of  avear  as  they  chose  their  child's  first-grade  placement 
from  a ong  eight  available  options. 
The  process  of  decision  making  involves  several  phases 
(Byrnes,  1998;  Galotti,  2002).  All  of  the  studies  summarized 
here  focused  on  d cision  structuring ﾑ the  phase   which  t e
individual  considers  options  and  decides  on cri eriao  be  used 
in  choosing  among those  options.  The  decision-structuring 
phase  ems  key  to  a number  of  theoretical  descriptions  of  de ﾂ 
cision  making  (see  Byr es,  1998,  for  a eview),  and  ithas  been 
asserted  that  individual  differences  i   decision  making  are 
especially  L'ke v  to  emerge  during  this  phase  (Scott  &  Bruce, 
1995).   VoIlJITK  18 N  umbel  4 







TABLE  1 
Overview  of  the  Five  Studies 
Primary 
Study D 。。 田 。 nstudi 。  W Population     method Individual  ifferences  studied 
  Choosing  a  college 322  (90  in High  school Survey A 。， d 。 血 。北山 ty(g 「， dePoint 
cores 狐 ple) juniors average,  standardized  test   
  Choosing  a  major Ill               ]  ﾇt-year  college Survry None   students 
    88 Pregnant  women Interview Education  completed,  pre¥ious   over  age  18 experience 
    133           Ist-vear  college Survey Decision-making  style 
core  sample! students 
  Choosing  a  first-grade 243  (139  in Parents  of Interview Decision-making  style,education 
placement core  sample)                    completed,  previous  experience 
Note.  For  each  study,  N  indicates  th   number  of  individuals  who  participated  in  at  l ast  one  session,  a dthe  core  sample  includes  only  those  who 
participated  in  ll  phases  
MODELS  OF  DECISION  MAKING survivors,  the decision  maker  presumably  attempts  to  discover 
new  options   
Three  theoretical  models  frame  the  present  a alysis  of  these Both  traditional  li ear  models  andimage  theory  focus  on 
studies.  The first  is  multiattribute  ut lity  h ory  (MAUT).  In  this nonexpert  decision  making.  Other  models  of  rea1-1ife             
mode1,  decision  makers  (a)break    decision  down  into  inde-  making  describe  how  experts  with  many  years  of  experience 
pendent  criteria,  (b)  determine  the relative  importance  ofach  make  decisions  within  their  doma  ofexpertise,  often  u der 
criterion,  (c)  list  all  options  under  considera , and  (d)  rate  time  pressure  or  oth r  types  ofstress  (Zsambok  &  Klein,  1997)   
。、。 h  "Ph 。 n  。 n  。 " 。 h  。，ぬ ， i 。 n ・ U"d 。 r 。 。 rtam  as5umPtion ， ( 。卍 -  ロ。 in'sn@S(1998) ， 。。 。 gnition-P ， im。d  d" 。 i ， i 。 "-m 、 king  modelw"5 
th 、 tall 。 川 。 n ， arelisted  andthatall 。 而 "血 areindependent),  d 。h"。 dfrom  。 b ，。 NationofofexP 。 n ，， in 。 I"di" 如， e 。 。 mm ， "der ，。 
MAUT  and  other  s0-called  linear  models  of  decision  making  can neonatal  intensive-care  nurses,  andmilitary  commanders.  Klein 
be  shown  to be  normative,  meaning  that  people  who  follow  these  and  his  colleagu s  foundthat  these  xperts  were  unlikely  to 
models  maximize  their  own  utility  so  asto  best  achieve  their  consider  multiple  options  simultane u ly.  Instead,  they quickly 
goals  (Dawes,  1982:  Keeney,  1992)  categorized  a  situation,  even  a novel  one,  as  an                  
However,  some  researchers  have  arguedthat         ･  rarely,  if pattern  or  prototv]'ie  and  then  implemented  the  appropriate  s0- 
ever,  use  MAUT  spontaneously  when  making  important  deci-  lution  from  memory.  Thus,  the  recognition-primed  decision- 
sions,  especially  if  the  relevant  information  is  extensive  (Klein,  making  model  pr dicts  that options  will  be  considered            
1998;  Payne,  1976;  Payne,  Bettman,  &  Johnson,  1993).  Other  with  only  e  under  active  consideration  at   time   
researchers  hav   claimed  that  people  are  quite  unlikely  to  use The  five  studies  summarized  here all  focused  on   important, 
analytical  pro edures  (such  a  those  involved  with  linear  mod-  rea1-1ife,  no mergency  decision  making  by nonexperts.  Dif-
。 l ， )whenmakingfmpo 「 tantdeci ， @on5(F ， is nSCn&  。 ロ。m 。 n ， 1994).  f" 「。 "tdec 日 olonswe ， e ， t"died  b 。 。 "Me 。 fthe  。 Mm  th 、 tpeoPle 
Image  theory  (Beach,  1993,1998)  is one alternative  to  MAUT.  may  perform  very  differently  when  they  face  differ nt  kinds  of
ItlocalCStheh 。 、 n@  Ofdeci ，  。"m 、 ki 叩 inaP ，。。。 ， 5knownaSthe  d 。。 i ， i 。 " ， (p"yne  td ・， 1993) ・ m 。 research  W 、 Sailalm 。 d  atP ， 。 - 
prechoice  screening  of    options.  I  this  phase,  decision  makers  viding  at least  preliminary  answers  to  the  following  questions  
winnow  the  number  of  options  to  a mall  number,  sometimes  one 
or  tw0.  They  do  this  byassessing  whether  each  new  goa1,  plan,  or  ･  How  much  information  do  people  actively  consider  when 
alternative  is  compatible  with three  imag s:  the  value  imag making  important  decisions? 
(containing  the r  values,  morals,  andprinciples),  the  trajectory  ･  How  consistent  ar   people  intheir  thinking  about  an  impor- 
image  (containing  their  goals  and  aspirations),  and  the  strategic tant  decision  over  time? 
image  (the  ways  in  which  t ey  plan  to  attain  their  goals).  Options  ･  How  much  do  people's  overall  views  of  the  goodness  of  dif- 
judged  incompatible  with  any  imagare  screened  out. Screening ferent  options  correspond  to  the ･  values  predicted  by  norma- 
may  result  in  only  a single  option  remaining  active;  inthis  case, 1ive  linear  models  based  on  people's  own  criteria,  importance 
the  decision  maker's  final  choice  issimply  whether  or  not to weightings,  and  perceptions  of  options    those  criteria? 
MC"pt th 、 toPtion ・ Ifth 。 re  i"  more  th"n  。 "e  surVlv 。 r ofofthe  ・ wh"tso:so 「 nSofindividualdif6erences( 。卍 "  in  ed" 。、 ti 。 n ， e ， - 
screening  phase,  the  decision  maker  may  use  compensator}-  or                 "ision-making  style)  influence  people's  deci- 
other  decision  strategics  to  make  the  final  choice.  If there  are no sion-making  processes? 
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TAKLE  2 
Mean  Number  of  Options,  and  Criteria  Considered  b-) 
Participants  in  E ch  Study   
Number  of Number  of
Study options  considered criteria  considered 
  4 ・ 35   
  3 ・ 95 6 ・ 77 
  Not  assessed 3 ・ 47 
  4 ・ 78 5.90 
  2 ・ 68 5 ・ 13 
RESULTS  AND  DISCUSSION 
Table  2presents  de criptive  results  for  the  information  partic ﾂ 
ipants  reported  consi ering  when  making  their  decisions.  Des ﾂ 
pite  the  different  sampl s  r cruited,  the  different  decis ons 
studied,  and the  different  me hodologies  used,  the results  are 
remarkable  consistent.  At  a y  g ven  point,  people  reported 
considering  a  small number  of  options  (between  two  and  five) 
and  only  a slightly  larger  number of  criteria  (between  3  a d  9). 
In  making  rea1-1ife  d cisions,  people  ap ar  to  constrain  the 
amount  of  information,  and  especially  the  number  of  options, 
that  they  actively  consider.  This  finding  is  pec fically predicted 
by  image  theory  (Beach,  1998). 
Participants  in  these  studies  rarely,  if ever,  eported  consid ﾂ 
ering  a  single  option  at  a  me.  Thus,  they  were  not  behaving  l ke 
Klein's  (1998)  experts.  The  recognition-primed  decision-mak- 
ing  mode1,  then.  may  pertain  exclusively  to  expert  decision 
makers  operating  within  the r  domain  of expertise. 
Thus,  the  answer  to  the  question  about  how  much  information 
people  actively  consider  when  mak ng  important  decisions  is 
that  they  consider  more  than  one  option  at a  time.  hut  only  a 
small  fraction  of  the  information  potentially  available.  This 
conclusion  i   reminiscent  of  Perkins's  (1985)  finding  that 
undergraduate  nd  graduate  students  who  w re  reasoning  inﾂ
formally  tended  to"underexplore"  issues,  settling  very  quickly 
on  lines  of  reasoning  that  made  superficial  sense. 
0ver  time.  the  number  of  options  u der  active  consideration 
grows  maller,  another  finding  predicted
However,  the number  of  criteria  in use  does 
theory. 
e  same H 
       
n"rrow@"g ・ I"S 。 meoftheRvestudies ， mhen"mberofC ， it 。ria 卜 
use  actually  rose  slightly  over  time,  perhaps  s  people  discov ﾂ 
ered  new  dimensions  of  their  decision.  Table  3  pres nts  these 
results ・ O"eramoderatetfue ト "m 。 (6  monthsto 孔 ooutay 。 " ， ) ， 
abouthalfthe 。 niterI"i"" ， "rh 、 叩 。 d;the ， pecihCoPti 。 " ， ""d 。， 
consideration  were  more  stable.  Nonetheless,  th re  was  more 
change  in the  decision-making  process  than  the  raw  numbers 
indicate. 
How  normatively  good  is  people's  r a1-1ife  decision  mak ng? 
To  address  this  question,  I  examined the degree  to  which  pe0- 
pie's  holistic  and  intuitive  appraisals  of  options  were  correlated 
with  the  predictions  of  different  linear  models,  including  MAUT. 
For  each  model  considered,  I  pr dicted  a  laliie  for  each  op ﾂ 
tion@@a  me sure  of  the  overall  goodness  that option  ught  to
have,  given  the  model's  particular  way  of  combining  ratings  o  
the  various  criteria.  These  predicted  values  were  correlated  with 
participants'  overall  impressions  of  the  options  they  were  con- 
sidering. 
Predictions  of  three  linear  models  were  xamined.  Th   first 
was MAUT.  This  model  incorporated  all  the  information  a  par ﾂ
ticipant  pro¥  ]  ded  fhe  importance  weighting  of  a  gii en  criterion 
was  multiplied  b¥  the  subjective  rating  of ach  op onon  that 
criteri n,  and  the  products  for  eachoption  were  summed  over  all 
TABLE  3 
Consistency  in  Information  Considered  Over  Tim ,by  Study   
N"mb 。 ，。 f   
Number  of options criteria Options Criteria 
Study Times  of  assessment   considered considered considered 
  Time  1:  April  of  junior  year mme I: 4 ・ 5 「 Time  1: 9.02 Times  1-2:  48 Times  1-2:  49 
Time  2:  October  of  senior  vear Time  2:  3.99 Time  2:  9.64 Times  2-3:  69 Times  2-3:  52 
Time  3:  April  of  senior  year Time  3:  3.50   Time5 1 ― 3: 43 Tmes I ― 3: 48 
  Time  1:  winter  of  rei'-hman  ¥par Time  1:  4.18   Times  1-2:  51 Times  1-2:  44 
Time  2:  spring  ofsophomore Time  2:  2.94   
year  (just  before  d claration) 
  Time  1:  winter  of  reshman  ve r Time  1:  4.73   Times  1-2:  84 Times  1-2:  50 
Time  2:  spring  ofsophomore Time  2:  3.82 Time  2:  7              t yPeS "j 
vear  (just  after  declaration) 
  Time  1:  fall  ofchild's Time  1:  2.59 Time  1:  5.97 Times  1-2:  72 Times  1-2:  47 
kindergarten  year Time  2:  2.89 nme 2: 4 ・お 
Time2: ， P ， i"g 。 f 。 hild'5 
kindergarten  year 
Note.  Thi?  table  reports  results  for  the  core  samples  only.  Study  3  is  not  included  because  there  was  no  longitudinal  component  in  that  study   
"'In  this  studv,  options  were  categorized  Ly  division,  rather  than  by  specific  major.  The  categoric,'  used  were  ^'natural  science                        
and  '"  humanities." 
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criteria  l sted.  Thus.  each  potential  option  received  a  summary 
score.  These  scores  were  correlated  with  participants'  ove all 
impression  (holistic)  ratings  f  the  op ons.  P sitive  correlations 
indicate  better  calibration  with  MAUT  p edictions. 
The  full  MALT model  makes  the  questionable  assumption 
that  people's  as essments  of weights  make  use  of  true  ratio 
scales.  Some  evidence  suggests  that  self-reported  weights  ar  
not  good  predictors  of  the  true  weights  people  assign  to  criteria 
(ReiUy  &  Doherty,  1989).  Therefore,  T  also  xamined  predic ﾂ 
tions  from  tw   simpler  linear  models  that  did  not  make  use  of 
subjective  importance  weights.  One  was  an  equaUy-weighted- 
cntena  mode1.  In this  case,  the  expected  value  for  each  option 
was  computed  by  giving  all  criteria  equal  weight  (i.e.,the  par ﾂ 
ticipant's  own  importance  weights  were  ignored);  the  subjective 
ratings  of  a  given  option  on  each  criterion  were  summed 
to  calculate  the  expect d  value  for  that  ption.  Expected 
values  were  correlated  with  participants'  holis   r tings  of  ll 
the  options. 
The  second  alternative  to  the MAUT  model  was  the  top-cri ﾂ 
terion  mode1.  Forthis  simple  mode]  (which  isvery  similar  to 
Gigerenzer  and  Goldstein's,  1996,  "take  the  best"  algorithm), 
predicted  value  ofan option  wascalculated  by  using  only  the 
rating  on the  criterion  to  which  a  participant  had  given  the  highest 
importance  weighting.  If  a  participant  had  given  more  than  one 
criterion  the highest  weight,  hen  the  average  rating  on  all  such 
criteria  wascomputed  as  the  predicted  value  of  that  option. 
Expected  values  were  correlated  with  participants'  holis ic  ratﾂ 
ings  ofall  the  options. 
Table  4 presents  the calibration  coefficients  for  each  stud). 
0veral1,  people's  holistic  assessments  ofoptions  correlated 
substantially  with  the  predictions  of  lin armodels  derived  from 
normative  theories  of  d cision  making  (correlations  were  i   the 
range  from  .53  to  .90).  Thus,  as  measured  bv  arguably  normative 
models  of decision  making,  people's  overall  intuitions  show  a 
surprisingly  good  degree  of  rationality.
The  final questlon  I aaddress  。 O" 。。。 "S  the  d 。g ， ee  t 。 whl 。 h 
I"dl"@du 日 dl ば。 ， en 。 。， a ばect  decl ， 1oon  m斗 l"g ・ F 。，。， 、 mPl 。 @ 
f 。 。 m 、 l  ， 。 h 。 。 llng  presumabIy  「 eI" ト「。。 ， sklIls  of  、b ， trmt 
thInklng  a d  。" 。 。 ur 、 g" ， m 、 lYtI 。 山 thI"kl"g ， a@and  soC。 uId  e"- 
COur 娼 eneoPletoCCn5ldermorelnf ・ ・ 。 rnLatlonorto ・ 。 On 山 lnen  ・ ・・ ln
more  。 :cmf ， l 。， w"V ， ・ The  ， "m"mlghth 。 trueoflni"ll 唱 e" 。 e  。， 
  
general  cognitive  abil y,  or  of  exp rience  making  a  particular 
decision. 
Decision-making  styles  might  also  affect  performance.  In 
some  of  the  studies  summarized,  I  adopted  Scottand  Bruce's 
(1995)  taxonomy  of  decision-making  styles,  which  incorporates 
five  styles  that  are  treated  as  istinct  stylistic  dimensions: 
rational  (characterized  by   thorough  search  for  and  logical 
evaluation  of  alternatives),  in uitive  (characterized  by  a  reliance 
on  hunches  and  feelings),  dependent  (characterized  by  a  s arch 
for  advice  and  direction  from  other  people),  av idant (rharac- 
t 。 h ， rdbyattemptsLoav ， otd  dec 田 。 "m 、 k 卜司 ， anrd5PonfanCous 
( 。 h 、r 、 。 fr ， izedbya ， e"seGfimme 山，。 ) ， Irandade ， ， i， "t 。 compIete 
the  processquickly@.The  or 巧"alinstrUmentScottand  BnLe 
d 。""l 。 p 。d  oaSsessd 。 。ぬon-making  styleswaasfound  to  ha"e 
g" 。 d  to excelIent  p ， y 。 home 田。 p ， 。 p 。， tL ， ぬ samples Of 
undeIg ， "du 、ほ， ， g ， adu"te  st"d 。 nt ，， and  milF" り 。 低 。。 F  ( ぬ 。， 
2000),  but  had  not  been  tested  during  episodes  of  actual  deci ﾂ
sion  making. 
Table  5  presents  results  regarding  individual  ifferences, 
ummarizing  observed  relations  with  measures  of  cognitive 
performance,  self-reported  affective  reactions  t   the  episode  of 
decision  maki g  being  examined,  and  participants'  escrip ions 
of  their  approach  to  that  specific  decision.  The  tableshowssome 
effects  ofindividual  differences  in  education  and academic 
ability;  here  w re  also  some  small  effects  of  cores  for  rationa1, 
intuitive,  dependent,  and  avoidant  style,  especially  in  thecase 
of  affective  reactions  and  ubjective  descriptions  of  the  apﾂ 
proach  to  decision  making.  These  results  suggest  that  emotional 
reactions  mav  mediate  the role  ofstvlistic  individual  differences 
in  decision  making,  ajthough  this  conclusion  is  pec lative  at 
this  time. 
Psychological  theories  of  d cision  making  have  frequently 
embraced  the  conc pt  of  bounded  rationality,  which  includes 
the idea  that  people  typically  use  only  a  small  subset  of  available 
information  」 o  make  decisions,  even  important  ones(Brand- 
statter,  Gigerenzer,  &  H twig,  2006;  Payne  eta1.,  1993;  Simon. 
1957).  Similarly,  studies  of  expert  decision  makers  suggest  that
they  restrict  their  focus  to  only  some  of  the  relevant  information 
(Cooksey,  1996:  Zsambok  &  Klein,  1997).  Thus.  it  is  not  sur ﾂ
prising  that  the  nonexperts  inthese  five  studies  also  restricted 
the data  they  collected  and  consider d.  P esumably,  they 
dopted  chniques  and  shortcuts  to  minimize  th ir  cognitive 
load.  Nonetheless,  as  measured  by  traditional  n rmative  yard ﾂ 
sticks  of  different  linear  models,  they  seemed  to  perform  sur ﾂ
prisingly  we 1. More  work  is  needed  to  identify  the  specific 
strategies  people  adopt  s  they  confront  decisions  in  new  con ﾂ 
texts,  as  well  as to  assess  the  generality  of  hese  trategies  across 
different  types  ofdecisions. 
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